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THE PLURALIST PREDICAMENT:
CONTEMPORARY THEORIZING IN THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Steven D. Smith1
“Theory” means many things, but in law the term typically denotes an effort to impose order on
an unruly collection of phenomena– of seemingly conflicting decisions, or doctrines, or legal arguments–
and to do so by self-consciously articulating and elaborating the foundational truths or principles or
policies that govern the subject in question. The modern law of religious freedom is celebrated for its
unruliness: hence, the need for domesticating theory may seem urgent. Unfortunately, the conditions in
which we live actively embarrass efforts to provide such theory. This essay considers the nature of our
current embarrassment.2
Unlike their Founding Era ancestors and to a greater extent than their European counterparts,
lawyers and citizens in the United States today typically understand religious freedom in terms of two
constitutional commitments– to “nonestablishment” or “separation of church and state,” and to “free
exercise”– that are at least somewhat independent, or even conflicting. The first commitment has been
expressed in legal doctrines requiring government to confine itself to the domain of the “secular,” to be
“neutral” toward religion, and to avoid saying or doing things that send messages either “endorsing” or
1

Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry Alexander,
Andy Koppelman, Brian Leiter, Michael Perry, and George Wright for helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
2

The essay was written in response to an invitation for a discussion, in approximately 10,000
words, of the “state of the art” in contemporary theorizing about the law of religious freedom. Any such
undertaking necessarily must make heavier-than-usual use of selection and distillation. These
streamlining methods have their risks and their costs, but they might also have benefits: readers will
judge.
1
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disapproving of religion.3 Decisions under these nonestablishment doctrines are notoriously confused
and conflicting. The second commitment– to the “free exercise” of religion– has sponsored judicial
vacillations between doctrines purporting to require government to avoid burdening the exercise of
religion and doctrines that merely forbid persecution of or discrimination against religion; and the
scope and contours of these doctrines are exquisitely murky as well. 4
So the call for ordering theory is clear. And yet little that deserves to be called “theory” has
been forthcoming. There are, to be sure, recognizable orientations– towards “strict separation,” for
instance, or “substantive neutrality.” But these orientations are most often supported by what we may
call (with no condescension intended) “lawyers’ arguments”– recitation of precedents, appeals to
“framers’ intentions” or legal text or entrenched mythologies about the same, ad hoc rummaging among
an assortment of ostensible principles or policies.

There seem to be at least two reasons why the

modern discourse of religious freedom has been relatively theory-lite. The more superficial reason has
been that American judges and lawyers seem to have supposed that questions of religious freedom
could be answered simply by invoking the constitutional text or its “original meaning.” So historyheavy, theory-thin analyses and polemics have played a larger role here, in both case law and
scholarship, than in some other fields.
The deeper reason for the avoidance of theory– and one that arguably motivates efforts to

3

See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989).
4

See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 474 U.S. 398 (1963); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). For an argument showing that these apparently different doctrines collapse into each
other, see Larry Alexander, Are Smith and Hialeah Reconcilable?, 13 Const. Comm. 285 (1996).
2
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squeeze more out of text and history than those sources can fairly be asked to supply– is, in a word,
pluralism. Judges and scholars have consciously or unconsciously supposed, not without reason, that
the rampant religious pluralism of our times is an impediment to the sort of foundational theorizing that
seems more feasible in other fields. Religious pluralism in a sense provides the subject matter of, or at
least the conditions for, theorizing about religious freedom: were it not for the fact that citizens and
officials adhere to diverse religious faiths, or to none, issues of religious freedom would not arise. But
pluralism also places daunting obstacles in the way of would-be theorists.

WHY HISTORY CANNOT OBVIATE THEORY
Let us start with the first of these reasons. One might almost suppose that the relative paucity of
theory in the modern law of religious freedom derives from the accident that the Supreme Court’s
seminal modern nonestablishment decision happened to be written by a Justice who vaunted his loathing
for theory (or for anything that in his loose but capacious conception smacked of “natural law”) and his
love for text and history. Thus, in Everson v. United States,5 Justice Black’s majority opinion
purported to rely entirely on an analysis of “original meaning”-- and the argument about what “the
framers intended” was on. In comparison with some areas of constitutional law (such as free speech
jurisprudence) in which text and “original meaning” have not played such a prominent role and even
self-styled originalists proclaim the need for theory,6 the law of religious freedom has often been treated,
5

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

6

See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 Ind. L.J. 1,
22 (1971) ( "We are ... forced to construct our own theory of the constitutional protection of speech.
We cannot solve our problems simply by reference to the text or to its history.").
3
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by both judges and legal scholars, as a straightforward product of history– history manifesting itself in
the constitutional text.
Some of the historical work– though not, alas, Justice Black’s– has been responsible and
illuminating. But even careful history cannot escape the need for at least implicit theorizing. The reason,
tersely put, is that history is not self-interpreting, and even at its most obliging it delivers to us concepts
or principles that are not self-defining or self-limiting. Even the most sanguine of originalists seem to
acknowledge that historical research can at most supply us with some general principle that the religion
clauses were supposed to embody. (Less sanguine researchers often conclude that the original meaning
cannot be ascertained at all, or that it is ambiguous and uncertain, or that the religion clauses were
initially conceived as a purely jurisdictional measure assigning authority over the religion to the states
rather than the national government: and this jurisdictional allocation has long since been forgotten or
repudiated.7) So interpretation of the religion clauses requires us, first, to figure out what “principle” or
principles are embodied in the clauses and, second, to elaborate the meaning of such principles in a way
that makes them presently useful and attractive.
The second of these tasks– elaborating the meaning of the constitutional principles-- most
obviously calls for theoretical work. Contrary to what “separationist” advocates sometimes seem to
suppose, it does not automatically follow from a principle forbidding specific subsidies of Christian
ministers that the state cannot include religious schools in a general voucher program: a good deal of
theoretical labor is need to get from Point A to Point B.

7

I have argued at length for this jurisdictional interpretation in Steven D. Smith, Foreordained
Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 17-50 (1995).
4
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But realistically, the first task also calls upon us for theorizing, because the text and historical
context simply do not yield any ready-made principle of religious freedom, even at a high level of
abstraction. 8 So if we are going to gather some principle from the text or original meaning, it seems we
have little choice but to resort to Dworkinian-style interpretation– to read the clauses as standing for the
candidate principle that will make them “the best they can be.” We can limit the candidates, if we
choose, to those that we think might have seemed plausible at the time of the founding: even so,
selection will be necessary. And that selection will call for argumentation that seeks to show that some
particular principle or principles are more attractive than the alternatives.
Consequently, beyond the general illumination it provides, good history serves mainly to counter
the dubious inferences that advocates draw from bad history, and perhaps to set some outer
parameters for the principles with at least a prima facie claim to be “the Constitution’s principle.” But
even the good history cannot tell us what religious freedom under the Constitution should mean.
As an example, take Philip Hamburger’s recent study.9 Hamburger’s book is a carefully
researched, skillfully executed effort directed against the assumption that the founding generation
erected, as Jefferson wishfully put it, a “wall of separation” between church and state. Hamburger
argues that at the time of the founding “separation” was viewed as a noxious doctrine that pontificators
and politicians of all sorts tried to pin on their opponents, and he traces how support for separationism
developed later, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and largely in connection with unsavory
8

According to the jurisdictional construction noted earlier, this failure to select among principles
was not an oversight or shortcoming, but rather was quite deliberate: the whole point of the clauses was
not to make such a selection, but rather to leave the matter to the states.
9

Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (2002).
5
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nativist and anti-Catholic movements such as the Know Nothing Party or the Ku Klux Klan.
Hamburger’s is a valuable study that effectively subverts what we might call the simplistic
separationist story told by Justice Black and, in only slightly less simplistic terms, by Justice Souter.10
Still, Hamburger cannot tell us what religious freedom should be understood to mean today. Indeed,
his study does not even foreclose the possibility of a somewhat more sophisticated “separationist”
interpretation. In fact, the “nonestablishment” views that Hamburger says were widely held in the
founding period sound not so different than modern separationist interpretations11; it is easily imaginable
that a sophisticated advocate might find in those founding era positions the basic “principle” of which
modern separationism is a logical development.
In a similar vein, consider Michael McConnell’s helpful study of the meaning of religious
“establishment” in the founding era. McConnell shows that although “establishments” differed, they
typically involved some combination of six features:
(1) [governmental] control over doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; (2)
compulsory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on worship in
dissenting churches; (5) use of church institutions for public functions; and (6) restriction
of political participation to members of the established church.12
In light of McConnell’s depiction, modern descriptions of comparatively innocuous arrangements as
“establishments of religion” may seem almost frivolous. Recently, having newly moved to San Diego
10

See Rosenberger v. Rector, University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 863, 868-72 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
11

See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note at 94-95. For a review elaborating on this difficulty, see
Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1667 (2003).
12

Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2131 (2003).
6
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from northern Indiana, I listened as my neighbor, a long-time resident, described the “winter”we had
just endured (in which the daily temperatures frequently did not rise above the low 60s) as “brutal”: he
had no grasp, I thought, of what winter even is. In a similar way, when a federal judge concludes that a
long-standing lease between a city and the Boys Scouts is “an establishment of religion,”13 the onlooker
fresh from reading McConnell’s account is likely to have a similar reaction: “With all due respect, your
Honor, you don’t have the faintest idea what an establishment of religion is.”
And yet McConnell’s history still cannot actually tell us what should count as an establishment
of religion today. Clearly not all six features are necessary because, as McConnell himself makes clear,
even regimes considered to be “establishments” in the founding period did not necessarily exhibit all of
these elements. So is one element– say, financial support– enough to make a religious “establishment”?
Financial support plus use of religious institutions to perform public functions, as in the currently
fashionable “faith-based initiatives”?
The point is that history by itself cannot answer such questions. In order to determine which
elements are required, it seems, we would want to know why the Constitution prohibits establishments
of religion in the first place. We would want something like a theory of nonestablishment– which
presumably might be part of a more general theory of religious freedom.

HOW PLURALISM FRUSTRATES THEORY
But here we encounter the more serious problem: the conditions of modern pluralism have

13

Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of America, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S. D. Cal. 2003).
7
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severely restricted the resources and options available to would-be theorists. So we need to consider
just how pluralism has affected theorizing about religious freedom.

Pluralism and “the Constraint”
Often the story is told more or less in this way14: In the Middle Ages, Western peoples were
united under a common religion, and so when issues about the proper relation between religion and
government arose (as they often did), princes and popes and scholars naturally addressed those issues
by appealing to what they took to be foundational truths as expressed in Christian scripture and
theology.15 But the Protestant Reformation and its aftermath shattered this medieval unity, so that by
now the ultimate truths themselves are the subject of profound disagreement. And it follows– or seems
to– that governments (and theorists who seek to explain and justify and advise governments) can no
longer appeal to those contested truths. To do so would rob government of its legitimacy, at least for
those citizens who reject the ostensible foundations. Moreover, to base public decisions on contested
religious premises would arguably manifest disrespect for those citizens who do not embrace such
beliefs: it might seem to treat them, to borrow a phrase, as “outsiders, not full members of the political
community.”16
14

See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in Secularism and Its Critics 31 (Rhajeev
Bhargava ed. 1998); John Rawls, Political Liberalism xxiv-xxviii (paperback ed. 1996).
15

See almost any of the arguments collected in Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State,
1050-1300 (first published 1964). On the heavily Christian cast of early modern theorizing, see
generally Andrew R. Murphy, Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent
in Early Modern England and America (2001).
16

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
8

Published by Digital USD, 2004

9

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 5 [2004]

By this account, in sum, the condition of modern pluralism effectively restricts government and
its theorists from appealing to (contested) foundational beliefs or “comprehensive doctrines.” Let us
call this restriction the “constraint on contested foundations,” or simply, for short, “the constraint.”
And just what is the content of the constraint? In what we can call its “narrow” version, the
constraint forbids government to base its authority and at least its most important decisions17 on
contested doctrines (a category that presumptively includes religious doctrines as a central instance).
The affirmative corollary of this proscription commands government to act in these vital matters on the
basis of shared grounds– a category thought not to include religious beliefs, at least in a modern
pluralistic society.
So government may not accept and invoke (presumptively contested) religious beliefs. But
may government reject religious beliefs? Although the question is debatable, what we can call the
“wide” version of the constraint, reflected in current establishment doctrine requiring neutrality and
prohibiting government from sending messages either endorsing or disapproving of religion, suggests
that it may not: rejection of a religious
belief surely sends a message of disapproval. More generally, the constraint is derived from the
perception that government forfeits legitimacy and manifests disrespect if it acts on religious beliefs that
some citizens do not hold. But the same conclusion would seem to apply– a fortiori, perhaps-- if

17

Theorists disagree about the domain of the constraint. The constraint might apply to all
public decisions, or only to decisions enforced coercively, or it might apply only to matters involving
“constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.” Rawls, supra note at 214.
9
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government rejects religious beliefs that some citizens do hold.18
In sum, the “narrow” version of the pluralist constraint maintains that within some specified
domain government must act on shared grounds, and hence must not invoke or rely on religious beliefs
to justify itself or its important decisions. The “wide” version, which seems at least on first reflection to
follow from the same logic, adds that government also must not reject religious beliefs.

Refining the pluralist story
Told in this way, the story about pluralism and the constraint provokes doubts. The depiction
of pluralism as a modern, post-Reformation challenge is suspect. Was it a happy consensus on
essential ideas that led Thomas Aquinas to undertake a monumental project of carefully listing and
evaluating pro and con arguments on a vast array of the most significant theoretical questions in
philosophy, law, and politics? And what about the large-scale movements of what the medieval Church
viewed as heretics, as well as (internally) Jews and (externally) Muslims, who very much claimed the
attention of Christian thinkers and political officials of the period? In short, any suggestion that preReformation theorists could appeal to ultimates because nobody really disagreed about them seems
vulnerable.
In addition, the inference from the fact of pluralism to the constraint against relying on contested

18

Some theorists seem of late to have embraced the view that government may reject some
religious views so long as it does so implicitly, not explicitly. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism
and the Establishment Clause, 78 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 717, 726 (2003); Andrew Koppelman, No
Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 729, 733-34
(2003). For my criticisms, see Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 625,
645-47 (2003).
10
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“foundational” propositions should raise doubts. What we might call the pre-modern (or perhaps prepost-modern) response to pluralism ran just the other way: it acknowledged the fact of disagreement,
inferred that among inconsistent basic beliefs at least some of them must be wrong, and strove in a
Cartesian spirit to develop better methods of figuring out what the true beliefs were. Thus, more than a
century-and-a-half after Luther posted his famous theses, and decades after an English king was
beheaded in the course of a civil war provoked in part by deep religious differences, John Locke was
busy attempting to demonstrate the reasonableness of Christianity and justifying religious toleration (and
political equality19) on the basis of (contested) Christian premises. A century later still, James
Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonstrance argued for religious freedom largely on (contested)
theological grounds.20 And Jefferson’s celebrated Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom began by
declaring its essential (and controversial) premise– that “Almighty God hath created the mind free” and
that coercion in religion was “a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion . . . .”21
It is arguable, in short, that pluralism (albeit in different degrees and forms) has been the usual
condition of Western peoples, and that the normal and natural response to pluralism is not to shun
contested foundational truths but rather to strive with even greater care and energy to figure out what
those truths are. And indeed, this response would seem natural enough today in many fields. Faced

19

See Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality (2002)

20

See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious
Freedom 72-75 (1998).
21

For a discussion of the shift in theoretical frameworks for thinking about religious freedom
from religious to more secular, see Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the “First
Freedom”?, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1243 (2000).
11
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with disagreements, do physicists or biologists or economists conclude that any appeal to contested
premises is taboo?
But these observations point us to a more precise description of what is distinctive about
contemporary religious pluralism: it is not the bare fact of deep pluralism so much as the widespread
acceptance of pluralism as permanent and natural and even desirable. If I disagree with you about a
proposition of physics (perhaps I believe in the “Steady State theory” rather than the “Big Bang
theory”), you will presumably think that I am mistaken and you will likely try to persuade me to change
my opinion. But if I disagree with you about a religious proposition (I am a pantheist, perhaps, while
you are a trinitarian), the contemporary ethos tells us that this disagreement is legitimate and enduring
and that we will probably get along better if we agree, at least tacitly, to respect and defer to each
other’s beliefs.
Given a general acceptance of pluralism as a permanent and legitimate condition, in sum, most
theorists of religious freedom are understandably loathe to base their theorizing on beliefs that are
themselves contested. But these are the very beliefs that would provide the natural foundations for
thinking about the proper relation between government and religion (and that at least until relatively
recently did provide the foundations for such thinking). So the contemporary situation is peculiar: it is
as if we were to tell a textbook writer, “Please include a chapter explaining the vast variety of life forms.
Oh, and don’t make any reference to notions of evolution or creation, because those notions are
controversial.” In such a situation, what can theorists appeal to? How are they supposed to do their
job?

12

Published by Digital USD, 2004

13

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 5 [2004]

ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AS FOUNDATION?
Perhaps surprisingly, most scholars of religious freedom have not perceived their task to be
nearly as hopeless as I have just made it seem. On the contrary, attempting to turn adversity to
beneficial use, they have typically taken “the constraint,” which I have presented as a formidable
obstacle to theorizing, as itself the proper foundation for, and even the essential content of, a theory
of religious freedom– or at least of the nonestablishment commitment. And this turning of the tables has
typically led them to adopt one or more among the ever proliferating variations on either of two themes
(or perhaps two labels for one theme) that also figure prominently in modern legal doctrines: neutrality
and secularity.22
Neutrality embraces the constraint in its “wide” formulation: it suggests that government should
avoid either invoking or disapproving religious beliefs by simply staying away from– remaining “neutral”
with respect to– religion. Secularity is responsive to the constraint’s “narrow” formulation: it tells
government (and theorists) what shared and non-ultimate purposes and grounds they can appeal to–
namely, “secular” ones. Though the terms are used in various senses, in their core meanings they are
usually viewed as complementary, or perhaps mutually entailing, or maybe even different labels for the
same basic idea. The standard assumption among judges and legal scholars seems to be that a secular
government is neutral toward religion and that a government that wants to be neutral toward religion can
do so by limiting itself to the domain of the secular. Hence, in a good deal of judicial and scholarly

22

The discussion in this section is my attempt to distill the key themes and objections in what
has become a voluminous literature. For two especially careful and contrasting analyses, see
Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (2002); Robert Audi, Religious
Commitment and Secular Reason (2000).
13
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discourse the terms seem almost interchangeable.
The secular neutrality position is attractive– almost irresistible, it seems– in part because, as
noted, it seems to solve the problem of pluralism and the constraint by adopting the constraint itself as
the foundation for and content of thinking about religious freedom. If modern pluralism means we can
no longer appeal to contested foundations, why not make the absence of foundations itself the
foundation for our thinking on the subject? It is an ingenious gambit, and the list of theorists who have
exploited some variation of it could make up a central chapter of a Who’s Who of elite political
theorists of our time: Rawls, Gutman, Macedo, Ackerman, Nagel, Audi, just for starters.
But the move also provokes suspicions. Isn’t it plain that anti-foundational notions like
“neutrality” and “secularity” are themselves contested, just as the more traditional foundations are? If
so, what do we gain– and what might we lose?– by shifting from one kind of contested foundation to a
different and more elusive kind of contested foundation? Indeed, isn’t the notion of an anti-foundational
foundation a contradiction in terms? The strategy, it seems, might depend on theorists being able to
flash dexterously back-and-forth between the anti-foundational and foundational sides of the secular
neutrality card– showing the anti-foundational side to slip past “the constraint,” then flipping to the
foundational side when theory must be done or actual decisions made, then flipping rapidly back to the
anti-foundationalist side whenever pluralist objections arise. The theoretical or juridical hand will have
to be quicker than the eye. So then what happens when the hand tires, or grows clumsy– or when the
audience starts paying closer attention?
These motifs and rationales and doubts have by now been played out in a vast and intricate
(and, truth be told, often tedious) apologetical and critical literature: in a short essay it would be
14
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impossible to even begin to sketch the full flow chart of the debates. In particular it would be foolhardy
here to plunge into the treacherous currents surrounding “political liberalism” as a general theory or
position.
Still, trying to limit ourselves to the field of religious freedom, we can perhaps say this much: in
the midst of the sound and fury, the critique of secular neutrality presses the central claim that secular
neutrality is not truly neutral. Purporting to respect pluralism and to ground itself in the constraint,
secular neutrality in fact shuts its eyes to pluralism and wantonly violates the constraint. And the
apologetical responses to this core objection amount to attempts– futile ones, in my view– to reframe
and qualify the central position so as to avoid this central criticism.

The impossibility of neutrality
The central objection asserts that neutrality– genuine neutrality– is impossible. This assertion
must be immediately qualified. The term “neutrality” is a label for many things, and nearly everyone will
like some of those things.23 For example, the term is sometimes used in an essentially procedural sense:
it means merely that whatever the governing rule or principle (or “baseline”) is, it should be applied

23

Recently, for example, “neutrality” is often invoked by proponents of broadly-based school
voucher programs that include religious schools on a nondenominational basis along with nonreligious
schools, or of “faith-based initiatives” programs that allow religious service providers to receive
government funding along with more secular providers. The approach may be attractive– I am inclined
in my waffling to think so– and there is nothing to prevent the use of the term “neutrality” to describe it.
But we should also note the very limited nature of this “neutrality”: it is a “neutrality” that selfconsciously rejects the views of both no-aid “separationists” (both religious and secular) and also of
those who favor public support for a more selective range of religion (Christian and Jewish but not
Muslim, perhaps).
15
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consistently without respect to religion. If the law prohibits jaywalking, the police violate neutrality if
they ticket jaywalking atheists but not jaywalking Christians. This sort of procedural neutrality is
unobjectionable. Indeed, it is probably tautological: it merely asserts that whatever rules or criteria
ought to govern, those rules or criteria ought to govern.24
But a purely procedural neutrality also fails to address the live questions of religious freedom–
or, for that matter, to ensure compliance with the constraint on contested foundations. Government
could satisfy the demands of a purely procedural neutrality, for instance, by mandating daily recitation
of the Apostles’ Creed or the payment of tithes to the Orthodox church and enforcing these
requirements impartially against Christians, Jews, Muslims, agnostics, and everyone else. So the
constraint calls for a more substantial neutrality; and it is that sort of neutrality that theorists attempt to
provide– and that critics believe to be impossible, either on a “meta” level or on a more operational
level.
On the “meta” level, we need merely note that the demand that government be “neutral” toward
religion already effectively repudiates competing views that have been passionately advocated over the
centuries, and that still have their proponents. Many have thought that government should support and
uphold religion: this view was widely held, for example, in founding era America (both before and after
adoption of the First Amendment). Recent controversies over, say, the Ten Commandments or the
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance arise from at least pale vestiges of this view. Others

24

For elaboration of this point, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266, 325-31
(1987).
16
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have thought– and continue to think– that government should actively discourage or even prohibit
religion. Communist regimes have taken this position, for example, and Graham Greene’s classic The
Power and the Glory narrates a dramatic example from Mexico; Stephen Macedo’s suggestion that in
the interest of democracy government ought to promote “wishy-washy” religion25 while discouraging
more fervent faiths is a kinder and gentler instance. Viewed against these alternatives, it appears that
“neutrality” itself is a contested and indeed a highly partisan position.
But set aside these “meta” concerns: at the level of actual operation neutrality in law is equally
elusive. To be sure, there are matters which simply do not call for any sort of governmental response.
Suppose two Christian denominations disagree about, say, the efficacy of infant baptism. It seems
possible– and highly desirable– for government to stay benignly detached from that controversy. But
other matters have a “for me or against me” aspect. Suppose, for example, that a religious pacificist
argues that he should be exempted from a general conscription law: a government that invokes
“neutrality” and declines to consider the claim will in fact have rejected it. In addition, government may
conceive of its own business in a way that makes nonpartisanship and noninvolvement impossible on an
operational level.
For example, if government does not take it to be a public function to provide education, or if
the public education system does not choose to teach anything about biology or human origins, then
government might manage to avoid taking any side in the long-standing disagreements between
evolution and creationism. Conversely, if government does establish schools that address such

25

See Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending
the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 Pol. Theory 56, 61, 63 (1998).
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subjects, it becomes well nigh impossible for government to remain neutral with respect to that
controversy. The state may say that because government must be neutral in the matter it will teach
evolution and not creationism– indeed, that is basically what the Supreme Court has said– but this
assertion is approximately as plausible as a President’s claim that because he favors a nonpartisan
judiciary he will appoint only pro-life conservative Republicans to the bench.26
These kinds of issues present what William James in a famous essay described as a “forced
option”27: to refuse to take sides is effectively to take sides. Suppose the evangelist says, “You must
believe in Jesus or lose your salvation,” and the agnostic responds, “You might be right. Far be it from
me to disagree. But I prefer to suspend judgment– to remain neutral in the matter.” In reality and for
all practical purposes, the agnostic is making a judgment and taking a position: he is rejecting the
evangelist’s appeal (and, if the evangelist is right, forfeiting his salvation). So if he imagines he is actually
avoiding a choice, James’s essay suggests, he is merely fooling himself. To a large extent, modern
pretensions of neutrality reflect a similar self-deception; and modern theorizing about neutrality serves to
26

See Smith, Foredained Failure, supra note At 77-97. Supporters may try to defend this
position by arguing that even though the teaching of evolution admittedly has the effect of contradicting
and thus opposing biblical literalist views of creation, that is not the motive or purpose of such teaching.
Schools teach evolution, presumably, not because they are trying to stamp out Christian
fundamentalism, but simply because evolution is supported by the available scientific evidence. But this
description, even assuming its complete accuracy, does nothing to rescue a curriculum teaching
evolution and not creationism from the suspicion that it fails to achieve religious neutrality either in its
effects or in the purposes and considerations that generate the policy. After all, as Stephen Carter has
argued, the assumption that the school curriculum should be based on what scientific evidence indicates
rather than what the Bible (literally) teaches, however sensible, plainly rejects one method of
ascertaining truth (and of structuring the curriculum) in favor of a different method. Stephen L. Carter,
The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 118, 140 (1993).
27

William James, The Will to Believe, in the Will to Believe and other essays in popular
philosophy and Human Immortality 1, 3, 11 (Dover ed. 1956).
18

Published by Digital USD, 2004

19

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 5 [2004]

provide the murkification that permits such deception to flourish.
Sometimes the fog briefly lifts, and the spectacle becomes faintly embarrassing. Observe
Edward Foley’s attempt to work out the implications of John Rawls’s liberalism for religious questions.
Foley relates how Rawls shows that in the modern pluralistic world the state must be neutral toward
religion; and as a devotee of Rawls, Foley wholeheartedly agrees. He notices, but somehow is not
troubled by, the corollary that the state cannot be neutral toward “illiberal” religions.28 But then Foley
goes on to worry that the liberal state will necessarily reject a whole array of familiar religious
propositions.29 Quoting a passage in which Rawls denies that political liberalism reflects a judgment
about the truth of even “unreasonable” religious views, Foley remarks: “I confess I am not altogether
sure about the meaning of this passage. It seems to me that liberalism does reject as false, as well as
unreasonable, the idea that the state must endorse a particular creed if the people are to avoid eternal
damnation.”30
There is something almost plaintive about Foley’s confession, but it is in reality merely an
atypically self-conscious instance of the predicament of “neutrality” theory (and law) generally. Some
claims by their very nature authorize a sort of dissenter’s veto; they render sincere objections selfvalidating. “Our decision is unanimous” or “This policy is desirable because it’s acceptable to
28

Edward P. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 Case
Western Res. L. Rev. 963, 965-66, 973-74 (1993).
29

Id. at 973-78.

30

Id. at 975 n.40. What Foley may fail to appreciate is Rawls’s attempt to separate political
philosophy from questions and claims about “truth” altogether. But that strategy produces serious
problems of its own. For critical discussion, see Jody S. Kraus, Political Liberalism and Truth, 5 Legal
Theory 45 (1999).
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everyone” are cases in point: a single “I disagree” is alone enough to defeat such claims. In the same
way, the modern discourse of religious freedom presents an unseemly display of judges and theorists
insisting that some law or public program is “neutral” toward religion in the face of vociferous objections
that “It’s antithetical to my religion.” The judicial and academic partisans of neutrality in effect respond,
over and over, “You may think this policy is inconsistent with your religious faith, but you’re wrong: we
tell you it’s neutral!” The refrain is not so much theory as effrontery, and it calls to mind C. D. Broad’s
comment on an argument he disliked in Kant: “This is of course absolutely indefensible, and charity bids
us turn our eyes from the painful spectacle.”31

“Shared” grounds: secularity without neutrality?
The critique of neutrality suggests that the secular neutrality position does not satisfy the “wide”
version of the constraint– the version that forbids government either to invoke or reject religious
beliefs. But might government, by confining itself to the domain of the secular (whatever that means32),
at least satisfy the “narrow” version that enjoins government not to rely on religious premises, and
instead to act on “shared” grounds? Might there be virtue in a secular government, in other words,
even conceding that it is not neutral toward religion?
Suppose, for example, that all citizens in a given community agree that government may act on
the basis of economic considerations, and some but not other citizens also believe (in accordance with
31

C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory 128 (1959).

32

Both “secular” and “religion” are problematic concepts, but the difficulties cannot be
examined in the course of this short essay. For further discussion, see Steven D. Smith, The “Secular,”
the “Religious,” and the “Moral: What Are We Talking About?, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 487 (2001).
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their religious faith) that government may or even must act on the basis of theological considerations.
A government that limited itself to economic considerations would not be “neutral”: it would have
rejected the religious citizens’ views at a “meta” level, and it would likely reject their more specific
conclusions at an operational level as well (if, for instance, taking theology into account would
sometimes lead to conclusions inconsistent with those reached on purely economic grounds– a “just
price” or “just wage” policy, perhaps). Even so, couldn’t we plausibly say that this single-mindedly
economic government, though not religiously neutral, acts on the basis of shared grounds? After all,
everyone does agree that government may act on economic grounds, which is just what government is
doing.
Advocates of secular government may prefer not to present their position in quite this way,
because the position is more appealing if secularity is held out as being benignly neutral toward religion.
But it is arguable that the numerous proponents of secular government, or of secular “public reason,”
have something like this position in mind. And indeed, a more open embrace of a “shared though
nonneutral secularity” might rescue jurists and theorists from the apparent effrontery, noted a moment
ago, of appearing to insist that a policy is “neutral” toward religion in the face of the believers’ protest
that it is not.
But “nonneutral secularity” provokes its own objections. In the first place, even disregarding
the occasional otherwordly ascetic who thinks that all secular values should be shunned, and thus
assuming that practically all citizens accept some set of “secular” grounds, it is doubtful whether a
government that acts only on such grounds can plausibly be described as acting on “shared” grounds.
The characterization rests on a description of the religious citizens as accepting two, severable
21
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propositions: (1) government may act on secular grounds, and (2) government may act on religious
grounds. Nonreligious citizens reject proposition (2), but they accept (1), which can thus be said to be
“shared.” In reality, though, at least some religious citizens probably embrace something more like a
single, complex proposition: “Government may act on both secular and religious grounds,” or perhaps
“Government may act on secular grounds so long as religious grounds are also taken into account.”33
The nonreligious citizens presumably reject this complex proposition; so there is no proposition in
common– nothing that is truly shared.34
But even if the secular grounds can plausibly be characterized as “shared,” the more essential
problem is simply that a nonneutral secular government would not avoid the problems that generated
the constraint in the first place. By rejecting much of what is most important to the kind of religious
citizens we have been discussing, and by allowing government to be responsive to all of the
commitments of secular citizens but only some of the (lower priority) commitments of these religious
citizens, the secular government would still manifest, if not outright disrespect, at least something less
33

See Eberle, supra note at 145.

34

For elaboration of the point, see Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”:
Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 955, 1009-10 (1989).
In more familiar contexts, we would immediately spot the common denominator
strategy as fraudulent. Suppose Dad and Daughter are discussing what to have for
dinner. Daughter proposes: “Let’s just have dessert.” Dad suggests that it would be
better to have a full meal, with salad, meat, fruit, cooked vegetables, and then dessert.
Daughter responds: “Obviously, Dad, we disagree about a lot of things. But there is
one thing we agree on; we both want dessert. Clearly the fair and democratic solution
is to accept what we agree on. So let’s just have dessert.” Although he might admire
Daughter’s cleverness, Dad is not likely to be taken in by this common denominator
ploy. The argument that secular public discourse provides a common denominator that
all citizens share is comparably clever– and equally unpersuasive.
Id. at 1010.
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than equal respect for the religious citizens. Indeed, insofar as some religious citizens cannot address
some issues (abortion is the common example) without relying on their religious convictions, a secular
public sphere would effectively exclude such citizens from participation in public deliberation and
decisions regarding such matters. Or, what amounts to the same thing, it would force them to
dissemble, or to effectively adopt assumed identities for public purposes.35
Proponents of secular government, or of secular “public reason,” typically try to rebut these
criticisms by arguing that secular government at least offers all citizens the possibility of a community
that is “fair,” or that operates on grounds that all citizens can accept “in principle,” or that all citizens
could accept if they were “reasonable.” “Reasonable,” in this usage, is understood to refer not so much
either to the substantive content of a belief or to an epistemic virtue, but rather to a quality of civility: a
“reasonable” citizen is one who is willing to live on terms that are mutually acceptable in a pluralistic
community.36 A different way to put the position is that a “reasonable” citizen accepts a principle of
“reciprocity.” So religious beliefs are excluded from some part of the public domain not because they
are wrong– such beliefs, the theorists of public reason cheerfully concede, might in fact be true– but
because they are not shared and cannot be a reciprocal basis of community. If I would not be willing to
have you impose your religious values on me, then “reasonableness” and reciprocity demand that I
refrain from imposing my religious values on you. Right?
Well, not quite. Once “reasonableness” is defined not in substantive or epistemic terms but
35

This objection is pressed in Michael J. Perry, Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal
Democracy 32-33 (2003); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious
Arguments Should be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 639, 655-56.
36

See, e.g., Rawls, supra note at 48-54.
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rather in terms of civility and the practical demands of community, then the content of “reasonableness”
is no longer something that can be decided from within the confines of the professor’s office; it becomes
rather an empirical and sociological matter. What do the citizens in a given community by-and-large
actually view as an acceptable basis for their civic enterprise? On what grounds are they in fact able
and willing to live together? There is no way to deduce answers to such questions from abstractions
like community, citizenship, “reasonableness,” or reciprocity. Citizens in one community might think
that public celebration of the lordship of Zeus is essential to the polis: a city that refused to acknowledge
this (to them) supremely important fact would be unworthy of anyone’s allegiance. And the occasional
citizen who raises a ruckus about what nearly everyone else regards as necessary would be
“unreasonable”– using the term, of course, as one of sociability. A different community might think
exactly the opposite, and thus might regard the polytheocratic zealot who presses for public
acknowledgement of Zeus and company as an “unreasonable” troublemaker. And so he would be– in
that community, and with reference to the values of civility and community.
In short, there is no way for mere theory to generate the content of a civility-oriented
“reasonableness”: it all depends, as they say, on “the facts.” Nor does the notion of “reciprocity” alter
this conclusion (except, perhaps, through rhetorically powerful obfuscation). Reciprocity (much like
“equality” in Peter Westen’s well-known analysis37) is a formal concept: it suggests that if I want you to
be subject to criteria or principles X, Y, and Z, then I ought to agree to be subject to the same criteria
or principles. No “X-for-you” but “not-X-for-me.” But the bare notion of reciprocity cannot provide

37

Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
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the substantive content of X. X might be “majority rule,” or “Rawlsian justice,” or “Benthamite
utilitarianism,” or “the true Catholic faith.” Whatever a community adopts as its governing criteria or
fundamental commitments, those criteria or commitments can with complete consistency be reciprocally
respected. And, conversely, an advocate can, by simply framing the question to his advantage,
describe any sort of position as a violation of reciprocity. (“If you would object to my imposing my
(fascist) political philosophy on you, then reciprocity demands that you refrain from imposing your
(liberal democratic) political philosophy on me.”) Reciprocity, in short, can do no work here– no
legitimate work, at least.

Dumb religion? Dumbed down discourse?
One sophisticated variation that arguably escapes these objections (and hence that warrants
separate notice) has been developed by Kent Greenawalt. In early work,38 Greenawalt powerfully
criticized the claim that public decisions should be based only on “rational” or “publicly accessible”
grounds– a category usually thought to exclude religious beliefs. Greenawalt argued that some public
decisions (such as decisions about abortion or animal rights) cannot be made on such grounds: so
nonrational grounds will necessarily be consulted, and in that case there is no reason to discriminate
against religious grounds. In addition, Greenawalt argued that any such constraint would effectively
exclude some thoroughly religious citizens from full participation in the democratic process.
In a later book39 Greenawalt revisited the issues. He emphasized, as argued above, that the
38

See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (1988).

39

Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (1995).
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proper grounds for democratic decisions cannot be deduced from abstract theory: the problem is a
sociological one, and hence what nurtures community and mutual respect in one society may be
disruptive or offensive in a different kind of society. In late twentieth-century pluralistic America,
however, Greenawalt believed the use of religious grounds for public decisions to be problematic. At
the same time, forbidding the use of such grounds would pose the problems noted in Greenawalt’s
earlier work. So he sought a compromise position or middle ground. But how?
Greenawalt’s answer is complex, but perhaps the most controversial aspect of his middleground proposal suggests a distinction between the grounds that citizens and officials may properly rely
on in making public decisions and those they may properly present in their public justifications.40 At
least in some contexts, he suggested, an official might rely on a religious belief in making her decision;
but her public explanation of the decision should be couched in more secular and perhaps generic
terms. Not “the Bible teaches that we should protect endangered species,” but rather “it is morally
right and in the public interest to protect endangered species.” In this way, Greenawalt hopes,
religious believers will not be excluded from politics, but the alienation sometimes associated with public
invocation of religion may be avoided.
One criticism asserts that Greenawalt’s middle ground authorizes dishonesty. But this objection
is misconceived: Greenawalt carefully explains that although his proposal contemplates less than full
disclosure of the grounds of decision, it does not excuse false accounts of those grounds. To be sure,
religious citizens or officials might still be hindered to some extent from whole-hearted participation,

40

Id. at 134-40.
26

Published by Digital USD, 2004

27

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 5 [2004]

because they will be restrained from unqualified articulation and advocacy of their full views. But in
what is self-consciously intended as a compromise position, this much restraint might be viewed as an
acceptable price to pay to enhance the civility of public debate.
Perhaps the more serious objection to Greenawalt’s middle ground suggests that it would
further enfeeble a public discourse that is already, as someone put it, “deeply, deeply shallow.” Public
justifications limited to generic claims that such-and-such is or isn’t in the “public interest” may be
inoffensive; but such justifications also give other participants in public debate little understanding of the
real reasons that motivate other actors, and little substance to consider and perhaps respond to.41
Greenawalt arguably misjudges the more serious deficiencies of current public discourse, which is
already too thin, not too richly substantive. Indeed, an observer who has watched a recent election
campaign might argue that current discourse combines the worst fears of all sides of the debate: the
discourse, one might plausibly conclude, tends to be substantively unrevealing and empty– but
nonetheless personally offensive, sometimes vicious. In this context, imposing further constraints on the
substantive content of the discourse may seem a miscalculation.42
In this respect, Greenawalt’s proposal serves to illustrate a concern raised more generally about
the liberalism in which “public reason” proposals are grounded. The constraint disfavoring the public
use of contested ultimates reflects a sort of bargain– or perhaps a wager. In a pluralistic society, the
constraint assumes, matters of ultimate truth are likely to be controversial, so we should steer public
41

See Perry, supra note at 38-44.

42

For more extended arguments to this effect, see Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech that
is Both Political and Religious, 29 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 793 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, Religious
Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 U. San Diego L. Rev. 817 (1993).
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discourse away from them. In effect we try to purchase greater consensus and avoid alienation by
making public discourse more innocuous. Whether this exchange will actually realize its intended
benefits is doubtful: we might simply be exchanging a discourse based on divisive ultimates for a
discourse based on equally divisive non-ultimates-- and getting an impoverished public conversation in
the bargain. In this vein, Ronald Beiner argues that modern liberal theory, with its commitment to an
agnostic neutrality, has produced a “reluctance to engage with the kind of large and ambitious claims
about human nature and the essence of our social situation that alone furnish a critical foothold for
bedrock judgments about the global adequacy or deficiency of a given mode or life.”43

Taking Pluralism Seriously
Beyond the particular objections and rebuttals, the neutrality and secularity approaches suffer
from a central (and ironic) failure: they fail to take their own premise as seriously as it deserves.
Starting with an emphasis on pluralism, ironically, the theorists favoring these positions in effect try to
wish pluralism away. They assume that underneath the pluralism at one level there is an underlying
agreement at another level– on some “neutral” default position, or some method of deliberation, or
some set of basic principles– upon which citizens can converge in forming a community. But when the
contents of this ostensible “overlapping consensus” are articulated, they invariably turn out to be
unacceptable to some– or perhaps to many, or even most– actual citizens.44
43

Ronald Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit 55 (1997).

44

Cf. Frank Michelman, Morality, Identity, and “Constitutional Patriotism,” 76 Denver. U. L.
Rev. 1009, 1023 (1999):
It is not clear how we can say that a constitutional norm such as "equality of
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We might put this point in a different way. The standard story about pluralism and the
constraint on contested ultimates suggests that modern liberal government is essentially different from
pre-modern government. Pre-modern government operated on the basis of some assumed orthodoxy.
Modern liberal government, by contrast, respects pluralism and thus eschews any such orthodoxy;
rather it remains agnostic regarding “the good” and the sorts of questions addressed by religion. The
criticisms considered in this section contest this self-description. Modern liberal governments, by this
view, of necessity operate from some orthodoxy, just as pre-modern government did. The real
difference, in this respect, is that modern governments attempt (with the help of legal doctrines and
theories) to disguise the fact.
Perhaps modern pluralism necessitates some such deceit. Contemporary liberal political
theorizing evinces an almost desperate effort to deflect, by whatever means necessary, an obvious but
fearsome challenge, which might be phrased something like this: If “legitimate” government must be
based on “the consent of the governed,” as the Declaration of Independence says, and if there is in fact
no proposition or truth to which all or nearly all citizens consent, then there is no proposition or truth
upon which legitimate government can be based. And it may seem to follow that the alternatives are . .
. anarchy (or at least the theoretical endorsement of anarchy) or . . . what? Denial and obfuscation,

concern and respect" remains invariant--remains one and the same norm--under
reasonably contesting major interpretations of it ("color-blindness" versus "anti-caste").
And that threatens disaster to the proposed constitutional contractarian justification of
politics. For, obviously, the justification cannot succeed if it turns out that the
constitutional "principles and ideals" to which everyone, as reasonable, hypothetically
agrees are just forms of words papering over unresolved and deeply divisive
political-moral disagreements among the reasonable.
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perhaps? If these are our choices, then it is hardly surprising if theorists devote themselves to
sophisticated projects in obfuscation– the more sophisticated, the more successfully obfuscating.
But are those the only choices?

DEFYING THE CONSTRAINT: FOUNDATIONAL THEORIZING
One possibility would be to rethink and perhaps reject the constraint– and thus to base theories
of religious freedom (and of government generally, perhaps) on foundations that the theorist takes to be
true (even though contested). In this vein, attempting to break away from the endless recycling of
neutrality and secularity themes, a few theorists have explored the possibility of overtly basing religious
freedom on religious foundations, or at least on contested truth claims or orthodoxies. This road is
currently less traveled by than the multi-lane highway of secular neutrality and “public reason, and it is
less clear where the road might eventually lead. Its modern travelers have concerned themselves more
with free exercise than nonestablishment.45 But we can notice some of the principal efforts.

A religious foundation for religious freedom?
Perhaps the most prominent attempt by a legal scholar to develop an account of religious
freedom on self-consciously religious foundations has been made by John Garvey. Garvey’s discussion
begins by criticizing familiar rationales for free exercise that attempt to honor the constraint– or, as he

45

There is no reason why religious rationales cannot be given for nonestablishment
commitments. Early modern advocates of nonestablishment often emphasized the importance of purity
of the church, and this rationale is still occasionally invoked.
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puts it, that adopt “the agnostic viewpoint.” Thus, the rationale that argues for freedom of religion as an
expression of personal autonomy fails to identify anything distinctive about religious beliefs or choices
warranting special respect; moreover, the rationale itself violates the constraint by implicitly adopting a
view of the person (as constituted at the deepest level by a “free-floating self”) that many religious
believers reject. And the rationale that argues for religious freedom as a means of preventing political
strife fails to explain why that end should not be achieved, in the case of politically ineffectual groups, by
repression. 46 So if there is a plausible case for religious freedom, Garvey concludes, it will be based (in
defiance of the constraint) on religious beliefs– on “the believer’s viewpoint rather than the agnostic’s
viewpoint,” and hence on “reasons that only some people accept.”47
So, is there a plausible religious rationale for religious freedom? Garvey thinks so; indeed, he
sketches four religiously-based rationales. Two of these rationales– that coercion of religious belief is
futile and unacceptable to God, and that freedom allows for the progressive revelation of God’s truth–
would operate to protect believers and nonbelievers alike against coercion in religion. The other two–
asserting in essence that believers owe duties to God and that violation of these duties will lead to extratemporal suffering– are more “lopsided” (as Garvey puts it) in their implications: they seek to justify
“free exercise exemptions” excusing religious believers from complying with generally applicable laws.
46

John H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms For? 42-49, 56-57 (1996). These objections hardly
exhaust the criticisms of rationales based on autonomy and civil peace. In this essay, however, I have
not focused on standard rationales for religious freedom based on this and similar generic values, largely
because I do not think discussion of such rationales has been the most interesting or important
theorizing about religious freedom in recent years. And the most serious theorizing on these subjects
has tended to criticize these generic value rationales as inadequate. For a discussion of the major
rationales and objections, see Smith, Foreordained Failure, supra note
At 99-117.
47

Garvey, supra note at 54.
31

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art5

32

Smith:

Garvey acknowledges that these reasons will be unpersuasive to nonbelievers, but he argues that they
are the best available rationales for existing constitutional commitments to religious freedom.48
In a trenchant criticism of Garvey’s analysis, Larry Alexander agrees that the familiar “agnostic”
or “neutral” arguments for religious freedom are unpersuasive; hence, a satisfactory argument would
necessarily be “sectarian.”49 But sectarian rationales like Garvey’s turn out to be equally unsatisfactory.
The problem with sectarian justifications, Alexander maintains, is not just that nonbelievers will find
them unpersuasive; the deeper problem is that they will justify religious freedom only for people who
embrace what the theorist or the state regards as true religion. Alexander gives the example of
Christian Scientists who believe God forbids them to get medical help for a gravely sick child. They
may believe that they have a divinely-ordained duty to forego medical attention, and that extratemporal sanctions will follow from the violation of that duty. However, not only agnostics but also
religious believers who do not share the commitment to faith healing will conclude that these parents,
however sincere, are simply wrong. Hence, Garvey’s divine duty and extra-temporal suffering
rationales will not justify protection for the Christian Scientists.50

More generally, “[r]eligious believers do not view compliance with imagined duties as a good.
Rather, they view compliance with actual duties as a good.” Consequently, “a religious argument for

48

Id. at 46-57.
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Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of a Religious
Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 Drake L. Rev. 35 (1998).
50

Id. at 40-41.
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religious freedom will account for only that amount of freedom consistent with the religion’s account of
Truth. And that amount of religious freedom may be quite small indeed.”51

The centrality of conscience?
Is Alexander’s objection answerable? Consider closely the often quoted words of Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance: “It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.” Read one way, the assertion hints at a conception
of religion that might avoid the objection. It is true, we might reply to Alexander, that freedom of
religion protects the exercise only of true religion; but it turns out, happily, that true religion for any
given person just is what that person thinks it is. So everyone’s religion is protected after all.
Though this conception of religion might avoid Alexander’s objection, as just presented the
conception also seems untenable. Who actually believes that truth, in religion, is whatever anyone
thinks it is? Or, rather, who can coherently believe this?52 And the formulation quickly leads to
embarrassment. You ask, “What should I believe about religion?” I answer, “Anything you sincerely
believe will be true– for you.” But this doesn’t help. “Wonderful!” you respond. “So I can’t go
wrong. Except . . . that’s only if I actually believe, right? And I still don’t know what to believe.”
Taken for all it is worth (and perhaps a bit more), in short, Madison’s claim seems untenable.
But the claim points to something that many have accepted: the importance of “conscience.” Noah
51

Id. at 40, 43.

52

The qualification is necessary because it seems that many religionists today do at least think
they believe something that resembles this aggressively latitudinarian position. See generally Alan
Wolfe, The Transformation of American Religion 67-95 (2003).
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Feldman argues persuasively that a commitment to “freedom of conscience” was the central theme in
the Anglo-American tradition of religious freedom from the time of Locke until well into the twentieth
century53; and even if it has lost its primacy, the commitment is still widely honored. The appeal of
conceiving of religious freedom in terms of “conscience” in a pluralistic society is evident: “conscience”
makes room for respecting different views of what religion and morality require.
But if pluralism makes freedom of conscience especially attractive, pluralism also tends over
time to erode the value of conscience, or even to debase the concept. Reflection on the concept can
show how this deterioration is likely to happen.
Consider the proposition: “You should always do what you conscientiously think is right.” In
one sense, this is merely a truistic proposition-- like “You should believe what you really think is true”
or “You should bet on the horse that you actually think will win.” Thus understood, conscience is
unobjectionable, but it can claim no special dignity or respect. Invoked in support of anything you or I
disapprove of, the plea “I did it from conscience” will elicit the same response that “I sincerely believed
‘Lucky Number’ would win the Derby” provokes: “Too bad. You were wrong.” Conscience can
claim some special respect, it seems, only if we think there actually is some virtue or dignity that
attaches to doing something because someone believes it is right– even if they are mistaken.
But why might that be so? A particular religion or theology might provide a rationale. I have
argued elsewhere that in an “ultra-protestant” theology, Martin Luther’s notions of “justification by
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faith” and “imputed righteousness” might be extended to the creedal component of religion54: in this
way, a believer might be able to conclude that even a religion she regards as false may nonetheless be
“counted as” true (by a benevolent deity) for those who conscientiously believe and practice it. But this
is a religious rationale for respecting conscience (as in fact the classical account of conscience was55).
It is harder to see how a purely secular philosophy could support the same move.
The crucial point, in any case, is that the value of conscience is not just self-evident and freestanding: conscience is something that will be highly esteemed by some encompassing philosophies or
“comprehensive doctrines,” but not by others. And that observation allows us to appreciate how
although conscience might support pluralism, pluralism might in turn undermine the commitment to
conscience.
Suppose the “comprehensive doctrines” that prevail in a society at some point do in fact value
conscience. And respect for conscience serves to protect a variety of beliefs– including some beliefs
that are incompatible with the comprehensive doctrine or doctrines in which respect for conscience is
grounded. As these newer doctrines grow and proliferate, so that the original doctrines become
increasingly contested rather than generally accepted, the foundation upon which respect for conscience
is based is likely to become increasingly insecure. Even if some commitment to “conscience” persists
(perhaps through inertia or tradition), the result is likely to be confusion– as to both why conscience is
important and what the meaning and scope of “conscience” are.
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Such a declension is apparent in the current rhetoric of conscience. Noah Feldman explains:
[T]he modern understanding of liberty of conscience seems to be that every person is
entitled not to be coerced into performing actions or subscribing to beliefs that violated
his most deeply held principles. This definition differs fundamentally from that of the
eighteenth century in that it is secular. To the eighteenth century mind, liberty of
conscience meant that the individual must not be coerced into performing religious
actions or subscribing to religious beliefs that he believed were sinful in the eyes of God
and that could therefore endanger his salvation. Indeed, it was, following Locke,
literally “absurd, to speak of allowing Atheists Liberty of Conscience,” because
conscience necessarily related to one’s salvation, in which atheists presumably
disbelieved altogether. Because this view seems implausible today, liberty of
conscience may require some justification other than the religious justification that
underlay the eighteenth-century version of the theory.56
Elaborating on the justification problem and its implications, Feldman observes that if we “broaden
conscience to include secular matters of deep belief, . . . the Lockean distinction between the sphere of
the church and that of the state evaporates. Suddenly there is no clear rationale for allowing
government to take any action of any kind where it violates conscience; or alternatively, all attempts to
protect conscience look unjustifiable.”57
Providing evidence for Feldman’s assessment, Ronald Beiner suggests that a book on the
subject by David Richards demeans the concept of conscience.
The spuriousness of this recurrent appeal to the sacredness of conscience is very
clearly displayed in the discussion of pornography. How can this possibly be a matter
of conscience? What is at issue here, surely, is the sacredness of consumer
56
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preferences.
And Beiner goes on to scoff that “[b]y [Richards’s] contorted reasoning, the decision to snort cocaine
constitutes an act of conscience.”58
The difficulties in current conceptions of conscience are apparent in one of the leading
treatments of the subject by legal scholars. Christoper Eisgruber’s and Larry Sager’s analysis in a
sense travels a course just the opposite of Garvey’s: they begin by arguing at some length that religious
rationales for religious freedom or legal doctrines that privilege religion over non-religion are unduly
“sectarian,” and hence unacceptable in a pluralistic democracy. So any defense of religious freedom
will need to be “nonsectarian,” both in its premises and its applications. Eisgruber’s and Sager’s own
position emphasizes the importance not of privileging conscience as something especially valuable, but
of protecting it against discrimination to which it is especially vulnerable.59
But what is conscience anyway? And if it is not anything particularly valuable, then why should
the possibility of discrimination against conscience be so troublesome? Eisgruber’s and Sager’s
commitment to a “nonsectarian” approach severely limits the answers they can give to such questions.
They cannot allow the law to value and protect religious but not secular versions of conscience: hence,
the historical sense of conscience, as noted above by Feldman, is inadmissible. Instead, “conscience” is
reduced to a person’s “deep concerns”-- whatever the source or content of those concerns.60 “Deep”
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presumably has at least a positive resonance– most of us would rather be “deep” than “shallow”– but
elsewhere the valences are inverted: thus, Eisgruber and Sager argue that ostensible religious obligations
“in some respects resemble physical disabilities. Both religious obligation and physical disability may
make it hard for individuals to comply with otherwise neutral laws.”61 And this incapacity is part of the
reason for protecting conscience even though it is not positively valuable:
Nonsectarian judgment comfortably supports the conclusion that for some people under
some circumstances the demands of religious belief are “special and important” in the
same sense that disabilities are “special and important”: both can have profound effects
upon individual well-being. But it does not follow that either religious beliefs or
disabilities are “intrinsically valuable.”62

So “conscience” turns out to be a sort of disability with which some people are afflicted–
something akin to blindness or deafness– and it is protected against discrimination for much the same
reasons that we prohibit discrimination against disabilities. This conception, arrived at under the
acknowledged pressure of pluralism and the constraint, has plainly traveled a long way from the
traditional understanding of conscience as something sacred– as the “free response [of] the individual
called distinctively by the Divine within.”63

Toleration
In Locke’s writing, the themes of conscience and toleration are closely interwoven; and the
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preceding discussion suggests that positive respect for conscience is inherently a doctrine of toleration in
its core sense. A tolerant individual or government, that is, is one that is committed to some base
position or orthodoxy which prescribes that even (some) beliefs and practices that are wrong– those
based on “conscience,” perhaps– nonetheless should be permitted.
In recent years, toleration has received increasing attention from legal and political theorists.64
Within that discussion, two debates are especially relevant to our present subject. The first is the debate
between what we can call “liberal tolerance” and “liberal neutrality.” Is a position of tolerance truly
“liberal,” or is it objectionable because it assumes that some position or orthodoxy is the “official”
position of the political community and that those who disagree with this orthodoxy are merely
“tolerated”? Second, can a position of toleration be justified on “universal” and abstractly theoretical
grounds, or is tolerance of necessity a highly contextual stance based on more local and largely
prudential considerations?
It is impossible to rehearse these debates here. But the foregoing discussion already suggests
that despite its claims to being more consistent with pluralism and the constraint, liberal neutrality will in
the end amount to an exercise in self-deception. Hence, if liberal values (especially including religious
freedom) are to be respected at all, they will be maintained from a position of toleration. The discussion
also suggests that at least some of the ostensibly “universal” rationales sometimes offered for toleration–
“reciprocity” is perhaps the foremost– will upon examination prove to be empty and question-begging.65
64
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More generally, “toleration” is an orientation that by its nature must be understood and justified
relative to some prevailing base position or “orthodoxy.” That fact would seem to rule out in advance
any “universal” justification for “toleration” per se: the most we might hope for would be a convincing
and “universal” argument for some particular orthodoxy– Christianity, perhaps, or maybe a strong
version of Kantian autonomy– which would in turn justify a derivative but “universal” commitment to
toleration. In a pluralistic society like ours, the prospects for any such two-stage demonstration seem
feeble at best.
This is emphatically not to say that more local or perhaps ad hoc arguments based on widely
accepted values and views and traditions are futile: I myself have tried repeatedly to make the case for
toleration in these terms. But any general, all-purpose theory of toleration is unlikely to be forthcoming
anytime soon.

CONCLUSION: KEEPING “THEORY” IMPLICIT?
Given the difficulties of theorizing about religious freedom, it is not surprising that most jurists and
scholars have tried to avoid theorizing on the subject altogether. In comparison with some areas of
constitutional law, as noted, the law of religious freedom has more often been treated, both by judges
and by legal scholars, as a product of history– history manifesting itself in legal decisions expressed in the
constitutional text, perhaps, or in an ongoing and evolving constitutional tradition. I have argued above
that history affords no refuge from the need to theorize. For better or worse, though, it seems that
history can provide a way of keeping our theorizing largely implicit– below the level of public
presentation and often, no doubt, below the level of conscious thought. More generally, theory always
40
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involves both implicit and explicit dimensions; but the proportions vary from person to person and field
to field. And it is fair to say that for religious freedom, the imbalance in favor of implicit over explicit
theorizing has been– and will likely continue to be– relatively greater than in some other fields of law.
The self-conscious theorizer may find this situation unsatisfactory. Doesn’t the progress of
human understanding consist largely of bringing to light and deliberately scrutinizing what had been
merely presupposed or accepted out of habit? Perhaps: but then again the theorizer’s preference for
making presuppositions explicit might itself be a prejudice that flourishes best when not closely
examined. In any case, it is not clear that in the area of religious freedom modern efforts in making
principles more explicit have resulted in better law or better understanding– or even in enhanced selfunderstanding. Recent efforts to maintain the currently fashionable notion that government must not
“endorse” religion without repudiating a long tradition profuse with such endorsements– not only in rituals
like the currently controversial Pledge of Allegiance but in cherished political landmarks like Lincoln’s
Second Inaugural, the Declaration of Independence, and Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom– illustrate the embarrassment.
To be sure, arguments from tradition are like arguments from neutrality in one crucial respect:
both fail to harmonize pluralistic divisions under some encompassing principle. But at least tradition need
not (though of course it may) deceive or insult us by pretending to have harmonized them. Given our
theoretical frustrations, and in a situation of pluralism that raises deep questions of legitimacy, the course
of deferring largely to theory-burying tradition66 has its appeal.
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